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IN THE SUPREME COURT
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH
I
I

II

I DUDLEY M. AMOSS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
HEBER BENNION, JR., VERA
,V. BENNION, his wife, and BENNION RANCHING COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

Cases
No.
10393
and
10482

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by a purchaser to obtain specific
performance of an "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase" relating to properties in Daggett County,
Dtah, and Sweetwater County, '¥yarning.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon filing the complaint, plaintiff obtained a
ltniporary restraining order and, after hearing, a pre1

liminary injunction to prevent defendants from attempting to retake possession of the property. The
parties having agreed that a prompt trial was important,
the case was set for non-jury trial on April 27, 196.5,
but was thereafter continued to April 28 to permit a
pretrial conference. At the pretrial conference defendants demanded a jury trial which, if granted, would
have delayed the proceedings ( R 1-266). * On the basis
of the record before it, the court indicated it would
entertain a motion for summary judgment, and such
a motion was made by plaintiff orally (R 1-262). Next
day, a written motion supported by affidavits was filed
by plaintiff (R 2-40), and defendants submitted to the
court an unsworn "Offer of Proof" setting out various
contentions.
The court granted a summary judgment that the
Earnest Money Receipt and Off er to Purchase was
binding upon Heber Bennion, Jr., and Vera W. Ben·
nion, but reserved an issue as to their power to bind
Bennion Ranching Company (R 1-73).
Further discovery led to a motion for summary
judgment against Bennion Ranching Company. The
court granted the motion and entered a summary judg·
ment (R 2-98), but retained jurisdiction to enter a
"' Records were twice prepared for transmittal-but the :r~
records as transmitted are not necessarily related to thbe~ing
ticular appeals. whose desi~nati?ns they carry, an~ the du~nation
system is duplicated. In this brief, wherever possib.le,d es August
"R-1" will be used to refer to pages of the record file t~ record
17, 1965 (No. 10393), and "R-2" to refer t? .Pages .0 f ~eferred
filed December 13, Hl65 (No. 10482). Depositions w1l~be as fix~d
to by the name of the deponent and the page num er
by the deposition reporter.
1
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detailed decree setting out by legal description the properties, establishing times and terms of payment, determining damages for the defendant's failure to perform,
and fixing costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the trial court's judgments.
PRELI~1INARY

STATEMENT

Defendants-appellants are apparently proceeding
on the theory that by placing before this court a plethora
of impertinent material which was not before the trial
court; by including motions, orders, notices, certificates,
and transcripts which had nothing to do with the motions
for summary judgment; and by filling their brief with
misstatements, unwarranted assumptions, and innuendo,
they will be able to distract the court's attention from
the issues, and lead it to conclude that in such complexity there must be issues of fact.
On the ground that it was not relevant to the sum' mary judgment questions, respondent previously moved
this court for an order eliminating from the record on
ap]Jeal those matters relating only to the preliminary
injunction. Appellants seem to have taken denial of the
motion as blanket permission to extract from the transcript of the preliminary injunction hearing favorable
bit~ and pieces - ignoring self-contradictory statements
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of appellants and the totality of a transcript that demonstrates appellants' unjustified refusal to perform their
solemn, carefully thought-out agreement.
In this appeal the only pertinent documents are
the pleadings, motions for summary judgment, answers
to interrogatories, responses to requests for admissions,
defendants' "offer of proof," two summary judgments,
notices of appeal, designations of record, and certificates
of the court, which together comprise 97 of the 190 pages
of documents transmitted. In addition, the depositions
are relevant, as are those portions of transcribed arguments that contain concessions or admissions of counsel.
Respondent will attempt to point out facts which
were before the trial court and which, according to sworn
testimony of the defendants, are not genuinely disputed.
Of necessity, some reference will have to be made to
the hearing on the motion for the preliminary injunc·
tion (even though not properly part of the record) since
appellants place their primary reliance upon it.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Respondent's Statement.

The action in this case was initiated by verified
I .t
complaint filed on October 25, 1964. The comp ain
alleged execution of a contract on August 12, 1964,
under which the plaintiff was to purchase and the M
fendants were to sell approximately 2,080 acres of real
property in Daggett County, Utah, and Sweetwater
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County, \Vyoming, known as the Bennion Ranches,
together with all real and personal property, including
range rights, water rights, mineral rights, machinery
and equipment, but excepting a life estate in a home
and five acres, along with certain water-use rights and
personal property.
The complaint contained averments of performance
of conditions precedent, plaintiff's readiness to perform,
delivery of possession of the property to the plaintiff,
repudiation of the agreement by the defendants, and
defendants' subsequent interference with plaintiff's possession ( R 1-1 ) .
The answer (R 1-6) admitted "preparation" of
the contract but denied that it "constituted a contract";
denied the performance of the conditions precedent and
denied repudiation by defendants; alleged lack of
knowledge of the plaintiff's readiness to perform; admitted that the agreement contained a provision for
~ttorneys' fees; and denied delivery of possession to the
plaintiff and that the plaintiff was entitled to possession.
As affirmative defenses the defendants set out ( 1) failure to state a claim; ( 2) failure of the plaintiff to make
payments required by the contract; ( 3) that the agreement was so indefinite and uncertain that it was not
susceptible of specific performance; and ( 4) that the
contract lacked mutuality. A counterclaim sought damages for tearing down a portion of an old shed and
for inconveniences caused by bringing of the action
and the issuance of the temporary restraining order
(R 1-9 to 12) .
5

No issue was raised as to mistake, fraud, undue influence, overreaching, or plain blackguardism; and none
as to the authority of Heber Bennion, Jr., and Vera
W. Bennion to contract for Bennion Ranching Company.

l The "authority" question appears to be an after-

thought stimulated by requests for admissions served
upon the defendants (R 1-30 and R 1-35, Request
No. 2} .J
The Bennion Ranching Company admitted that
on August 12, 1964, Heber Bennion, Jr., was president
of Bennion Ranching Company, and that no instruments of conveyance were tendered to the plaintiff on
behalf of Bennion Ranching Company, but denied that
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was
"genuine."

In their responses to requests for admissions (R
1-33 and R 1-35) the individual defendants admitted '
that abstracts with respect to 160 acres of the property
had not been furnished to the plaintiff and that defendants had not tendered to plaintiff requisite instruments
of conveyance or contract, but denied that they had
decided before October 25, 1964, that the property
referred to in the contract would not be conveyed to
the plaintiff. They admitted, in substance and e~ect
(if not words) that they had repudiated any obligatwns
under the contract of August 12, 1964, and that the
repudiation was communicated to plaintiff on October
25, 1964.
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At the pretrial conference - immediately prior to
the first motion for summary judgment - defendants
admitted that the Earnest Money Agreement had been
signed by Heber Bennion, Jr., and Vera W. Bennion
in their individual capacities and by Heber Bennion,
Jr., as president of Bennion Ranching Company, reserving the question of authority to bind the corporation
(R 1-265) . It was also admitted that no deed or contract of sale had been tendered to plaintiff, that abstracts
of title had not been tendered with respect to all the
properties. Defendants' counsel stated that no amendments to the pleadings were necessary (R 1-266). The
defendants insisted on the right to a jury trial (no jury
having been called theretofore). In connection with the
motion for summary judgment, defendants waived the
ten-day period provided by Rule 56, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (R 1-266).

'

At the hearing of the first motion for summary
, judgment, defendants presented an "offer of proof"
which did not meet the requirements of Rule 56 in that
it did not show personal knowledge, or what witness
might testify to which facts, and was primarily argumentative (R 1-61 to 72). Some of the material in the
offer of proof was in direct contravention of testimony
I given by Heber Bennion in his deposition. A large
I part of it was devoted to Bennion personal history, and
I lo conversations and conferences which would not be
I admissible at a trial.
The two motions for summary judgment were
based upon the pleadings of the parties, interrogatories

7

and answers to them, requests for admissions and responses to them, affidavits, and the depositions of Heber
Bennion, Jr., and J. Lambert Gibson. The information
obtained from these sources is not as confused as appellant would have this court believe.
Mr. Bennion first met Dan Brown in July, 1964,
at which time he told Mr. Brown he was interested in
selling some of his land to plaintiff. Mr. Bennion had
heard that Mr. Amoss had purchased the "Greathouse
Ranch" adjoining his property, and thought Mr. Amoss
might be interested in buying more land (Bennion 5
and 6). Shortly thereafter he saw Mr. Brown again on
one or two occasions, one of them being at Mr. Amoss'
ranch. The upshot of the meetings was that Mr. Amoss
made an offer for certain pieces of Bennion property
(Bennion 7 and 8) . Thereafter some discussion took
place with respect to what parcels of property might be
sold but no agreement was reached, and it came about
that Mr. Bennion suggested that Mr. Amoss and Mr.
Brown "buy the entire ranch." This was after Mr.
Brown appeared with Mr. Amoss (Bennion 18), prob·
ably on August 11 (Bennion 19 and 20).
Discussions took place at the Bennion home. Pres·
ent were Mr. Amoss, Mr. Brown, Heber Bennion, Vera
W. Bennion, and, during part of the discussion, an adult
granddaughter, Rebecca Buchanan (Bennion 20-~1).
The parties met on August 12, 1964, at which time
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was
filled out by Mr. Brown as the parties discussed terms
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in the Bennion home (Bennion 23 and 24) . Mr. Bennion
nirln't make any inquiry as to whether the $500.00 earnest money had been paid (Bennion 24). Mr. Bennion
understood the ".Bennion Ranches" to mean all the
properties the Bennions had in Daggett and Sweetwater
Counties (Bennion 25) . Most of the property lies on
the straight survey line, without angling, and although
there are some odd lots, it was possible to make a fairly
accmate determination of the amount of property without a survey (Bennion 26). At the time the contract
was sigued the parties understood that the conveyances
would omit certain acreage from the "Keel place" (Bennion 30). The contract made specific reference to the
life estate to be reserved in five acres "but not to the
Keel place," because the Keel place and the life estate
were being treated differently: Mr. Amoss would not
receive a deed for the Keel acreage, while a deed would
be given to the home and five acres, reserving the life
! estate (Bennion 30) .

!

At the time the agreement was signed Mr. Bennion
understood that all livestock and equipment would be
conveyed (Bennion 31) , except that specifically excepted. Provisions for conveyance of the range rights,
• water rights, and mineral rights had all been discussed
' prior to the time the contract was entered into ( Benmon
33). Constituting encumbrances against the properties
were a Federal Land Bank loan of approximately
' ~40,500, a Utah Farm Production Credit Association
loan; and a contract with R. Schofield. The Earnest
Jloney Receipt and Offer to Purchase (annexed to
I

•

•
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Mr. Bennion's deposition as plaintiff's Exhibit "I'\
provided, beginning at line 12, that the total purchase
price would be $197,000, payable in part by assumption
of the "Federal Land Bank Loan, PCA Livestock Joan
and R. Schofield Range contract." Mr. Bennion under·
stood that if Mr. Amoss paid the Federal Land Bank
loan it would be deducted from the price of the ranches
(Bennion 35). At the time he executed the agreement
Mr. Bennion read the print that was written in by
Mr. Brown, and neither Mr. Amoss nor Mr. Brown
did anything that would have prevented the Bennions
from reading the contract (Bennion 35). Prior to the
signing, a telephone call was placed at about noon to
the Bennions' Salt Lake City attorney, J. Lambert
Gibson, at the suggestion of ~Ir. Amoss. In that tele·
phone conversation Mr. Amoss read to Mr. Gibson all
of the matters that had been written into the contract
by Mr. Brown (Bennion 37). There was some discus·
sion with Mr. Gibson about the assumption of indebted·
ness, but nothing was said to Mr. Gibson by Mr. Ben·
nion about the effect the payment of these debts would
have upon the balance of the purchase price (Bennion
38).

Mr. Bennion understood that the agreement was
a "legal document," not just a memorandum of nego:
tiations (Bennion 42). Subsequent to the execution ot
the agreement Mr. Bennion did deliver to Mr. Amo)s
title to two trucks (Bennion 43) , and did go over some
AJUOSS to
of the equipment with Mr. Brown and M r.
make an inventory.

10

After the contract was entered into there was some
discussion about .Mr. Amoss preparing the deeds and
instruments of conveyance (Bennion 49), but preparation of the instruments by Mr. Amoss was not taken
into account in arriving at the purchase price of the
property. The only reason Mr. Amoss was being permitted to prepare them was that Mr. Bennion thought
he wanted to do so (Bennion 49-50).
The contract as written provided closing and delivery of possession on September l, 1964, but by that
date a dispute had arisen. The day after the agreement
was signed, Mr. Bennion said, he found some scratch
paper on the table that had been left there by Mr.
Brown, indicating that J.\!Ir. Amoss, at least, was planning to apply the payments made upon the PCA loan
and the Schofield Contract, as well as the Federal Land
Bank loan, to the purchase price (Bennion 53). After
the disagreement as to interpretation of the contract
was "discovered" by Mr. Bennion, negotiations took
place over a period of time and ultimately an oral agreement was reached whereby $17,500 was to be added
to the purchase price and the amounts paid to Utah
Farm Production Credit Association (approximately
~35,000), were to be deducted from the total purchase
price in the same manner as the amounts paid to Federal
Land Bank of Berkeley were deducted (Bennion 63).
Mr. Amoss prepared papers, including deeds and
mortgages. After looking them over, Mr. Bennion refHidiated the contract, even though he did not believe
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that Mr. Amoss was insisting that those papers be used
(Bennion 65-66) . Thereafter Mr. Bennion instructed
the Utah Farm Production Credit Association not to
accept money from Mr. Amoss in payment of the indebtedness there (Bennion 69). At about the time the
oral compromise agreement was reached, possession of
the Bennion Ranches was delivered to Mr. Amoss and
he continued in possession of them until about October
24, 1964, when Mr. Bennion told Mr. Brown he was
retaking possession. This led to the present action.
Facts dealing with the Bennions' power to bind
Bennion Ranching Company will be dealt with in the
argument of that point.
2. Disagreement with Appelwnts' Statement.

As required by the provisions of Rule 75(b) (2).
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the respondent sets
out below the statements of fact found in appellants'
brief with which he disagrees.

Page 5 of appellants' brief: "Conferences were had
between the Bennions and Mr. Amoss, accompanied by
Mr. Brown, ostensibly as the real estate agent. It later
developed, however, that Brown was a partner with
Amoss in the purchase from the Bennions." The st~te·
· h t he impr
· ess10n
ment is meant to leave the court wit
that Mr. Brown was Mr. Bennion's agent and was being
untrue to him by working with Mr. Amoss. But Mr.
Bennion's deposition (p. 8) makes it clear he had no
illusions about Mr. Brown's participation:
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"* * * LMr. Brown]

told me that he had talked
with Mr. Amoss about these lands and that they
were interested, or that Mr. Amoss was interested, and he said that they had decided - when
I say that, I assumed he and Mr. Amoss were
working together***." (Emphasis added)
Page 5: A statement that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was prepared "to formalize
an agreement which the Bennions expected would be
drafted up in the form of a detailed contract." This
would give the impression that the parties did not intend
the writing to be a binding document. Compare Mr.
Bennion's deposition (p. 42) :

"Q. * * * it was not just meant to be a memorandum of your negotiations as far as you were
concerned, was it?

A. Well, I understood that it was a legal
document."
Page 9: "Amoss and Brown completed the Earnest
Money Receipt and it was signed by Amoss as purchaser,
by Brown on behalf of Phelps Realty and by the Bennions as the sellers." The fact is that it was completed
by Brown in the presence of all the others, while the
discussions were going on.
Page 10: A summary of the testimony of J. Lambert Gibson is misleading, particularly the statement
that Mr. Amoss agreed "in precisely the same terms in
the Earnest Money Receipt" to pay the real estate
t:innnission as he agreed to assume the loans made by
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Federal Land Bank and Utah Farm Production Credit
Association. The provisions relating to the assumption
of mortgage indebtedness is set out in a different part
of the contract and in an entirely different manner than
that relating to the real estate commission. But all the
mortgage indebtedness is treated the same.
The following is found beginning at page 35 of
Mr. Bennion's deposition:
"Q. Did you read all the print that was
written in by Mr. Brown?

A.

I think I read that -

I tried to.

Q. On line 17 at the time you executed this
agreement did you call to Mr. Brown's or Mr.
Amoss' attention that the Federal Land Bank
Loan and the PCA livestock loan should be
treated differently?

A.

No, I didn't call it to their attention. ***

Q. * * * At the time you signed it you did
read it, did you not?
A. I say, I tried to read it. We had discussed
this and I tried to read all that was said there. I
mean, not the small print, but I did read where
it said 'assumed,' they would assume this.
Q. Now, neither Mr. Amoss or Mr. Brown
did anything at that time that would h~ve pr~;
vented you from reading the contract, did the)·

A. Oh, no.
Q. As a matter of fact, prior to the time
signed it, a telephone call was placed to ~ 1·
Lambert Gibson, was it not?

Yt
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A.

Yes.

Q. And Mr. Lambert Gibson was your attorney?
A.
Q.
he?

Yes.
Mr. Amoss suggested you call him, didn't

A. Yes; I suggested - we call Lambert,
Lambert Gibson, and Mr. Amoss read part of
this contract to him.

Q. Yes, as a matter of fact he read all of the
matter that was written in by Mr. Brown.
A. I think he read that, and then I talked
with Mr. Gibson. * * *
Q. You didn't say this to Mr. Gibson. It
was -

A. I said most of that to Mr. Gibson. I said
'I have just read this,' and where it says they
will assume - yes, I told him this.
Q. You told him that they would assume it,
but-

A. That where I said they would assume this
debt to Schofield and this debt to Utah Farm
PCA, that it meant they would pay it.

Q. * * * But, did you say anything to Mr.
Gibson about what effect this would have upon
the purchase price? Now, was that discussed at
all with Mr. Gibson?

A. Well, I don't think it came - went that
far, what effect it would have on the purchase
price if they paid it. * * * "

15

Page 10: A statement that on the day following
the preparation of the Earnest Money Receipt the Bennions noticed a piece of paper left behind by Mr. Amoss
or Mr. Brown, "perhaps intentionally" - indicating
something sinister, though it's not clear what. "Perhaps
intentionally," comes only from counsel. There is no·
thing in the record about it and no basis for speculation
about a plot. Such a slip of paper, if anything, tends to
establish that the parties were throughout talking about
the payments and credits in the same way that they
ultimately appeared in the Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase. It may be significant that Mr. Ben·
nion didn't save the slip of paper (Bennion 54).
Page 13: A statement that Mr. Amoss "again told
Bennion and Gibson that he understood there would
be no deduction except as to payments under the Fed·
eral Land Bank mortgage," is not even supported by
the record cited by the appellants, and that transcript
was not before the court in the first place. In his testi·
mony at the preliminary injunction hearing, Mr. Gibson
said he couldn't remember and wouldn't say that Mr.
Amoss said that the $35,000 wasn't deductible but that
he came away from the meeting with a particular "im·
pression." The statement that during the period up to
October 10, 1964, in repeated other contacts with Brown
and Amoss, Bennion was given to believe that there wai
no further problem in this regard is not supported by
the record. No citation is furnished. There is no support
for the statement that lVIr. Amoss "apparently felt he
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1
could force Bennion to abandon his claim to full payment."
Page 14: A statement that Amoss "claimed a right
to $2,100 worth of stock which Bennion owned in the
PCA" is misleading. As pointed out in the deposition
of Mr. Bennion (p. 61), although the question to the
right to stock was raised, J\!Ir. Amoss did not insist upon
receiving the stock.
Pages 14 and 15: The detail respecting the notes
and mortgages prepared by Mr. Amoss is misleading
in that it indicates there had been no previous discussion
as to release provisions, and that Mr. Amoss was trying
to impose new terms on the sellers. In his deposition
(p. 49) Mr. Bennion indicates that he was permitting
Ur. Amoss to prepare the documents because he thought
l }fr. Amoss wanted to, not because it was part of the
contract. There was nothing to prevent either Mr. Ben1
\ nion or Mr. Gibson from preparing the kinds of docuj ments they thought proper. In his deposition (p. 64)
i
j Nlr. Bennion says:

I
1

1

"Q. I take it as of that date, October 11, you
were willing to go through with the contract on
that basis?
A.

Well, sure, that is correct.

Q. And you remained willing until Mr. Gibson presented the contract to you you didn't like;
is that about right?
A. * * * I began to wonder - I didn't know
why there was so much delay, and some of the
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things he presented seemed so unreasonable to
me that . Q. These were some of the things that were
m the mortgage or the deed or whatever; is that
correct?

A.

In those papers.

Q. It was not because of any demands he
made upon you or anything qf that kind.

A. It was in the papers he had prepared for
us to sign.
Q. And Mr. Gibson explained to you, didn't
he, that this was something that Mr. Amoss
would like to do? Did he explain that to you?

A. 'Vell, I supposed it was something he
would like to do if he could, and it was something
so unreasonable and would be so damaging to us
that I couldn't figure out how he would ever
propose something like that.
Q. A a matter of fact, Mr. Amoss had dis·
cussed with you the possibility of getting some
land released ?

A.

No, I don't think he had.

Q. Hadn't he talked to you about an ex·
change of land with the Utah Fish and Game!

A. Well, he had talked about, yes, the pos·
sibility of him doing some exchanging, because
I had had a possibility of exchanging, and natur·
allv we talked about whether he would like to
co~tinue on with that or not.
Q. You realize that that would have required
some releases before the time the mortgages were
paid off?
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A.

Unless I did it before.

Q. When :Mr. Gibson presented this contract or mortgage to you, he didn't tell you that
:Mr. Amoss was insisting on this kind of arrangement, did he 1

A. No, he didn't say he WM insisting. I didn't
figure he was insisting." (Emphasis added)

Page 15: Counsel's reference to "duplicitous conduct" is completely improper, is not supported by the
record, and is name-calling outside the bounds of legitimate advocacy. No fraud or unfair dealing has been
pleaded or shown. At the time of the pretrial conference
on April 27, 1965, Mr. Bennion's counsel stated that no
amendment to the pleadings was necessary. Yet now,
in a brief, counsel talks about duplicitous conduct, coercion under threat of litigation, and a dozen other
affirmative defenses which were never pleaded, were
never in the case, and are not now in the case.
There is nothing in the record from which it can
be legitimately said that plaintiff "intended to renege
on the agreement where it was to his advantage to do so
and rely upon legal technicalities"; or to support the
statement that "without legal training Bennion could
not expect to meet him any longer on even terms." As
pointed out above, Mr. Bennion has been represented
by counsel for a long time, and the advice of his counsel
was sought before the agreement was ever entered into.
It may be assumed that if Mr. Lambert Gibson, an
attorney of recognized talent and standing in the Bar,
had had any questions about the meaning of the contract
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he would have told Mr. Bennion not to sign it until
he had a chance to examine it more carefully.
In talking about the failure to pay the amount
provided in the Earnest Money Agreement, appellant
conveniently suppresses the facts that no tender of the
Bennions' performance was ever made, and that the
conditions of Mr. Amoss' duty to perform hadn't occurred when Mr. Bennion repudiated the contract.
There has never been any dispute as to what the
"five-acre life estate'' was, the affidavit of Mr. Amoss
establishes that the five-acre life estate was pointed out
on the ground, and Mr. Bennion has never contended
otherwise. Mr. Bennion is in no position to take advan·
tage of the fact that no inventory was ever prepared,
since this was an obligation upon him. The contract is
clear that all of the personal property described in the
contract is to be conveyed. The statements that the
balance to be paid was omitted, "perhaps intentionally"
by Amoss and Brown is not supported by the evidence.
Of course, the balance could not be inserted into the
contract inasmuch as it was not known. The balance to
be paid would depend upon the amounts it was required
to be paid upon the Schofield Contract, the PCA loan
and the Federal Land Bank loan. The treatment in
the brief of the provisions for assuming the debts, and
for assumption of the real estate commission, is mislead·
ing. The two provisions are entirely separate parts of
the contract and are entitled to separate treatment.
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j

ARGUMENT
I

THE "EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
AND OFFER TO PURCHASE" WAS DEFINITE AND CERTAIN IN ALL MATERIAL
RESPECTS
AND
SPECIFICALLY
ENFORCEABLE.
After invoking inapplicable legal principles to create an impression that they were victimized, appellants
concede that an "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase" may constitute a contract, Bunnell v. Bills,
13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962), but argue that
such agreements are enforceable only when the properties are of little value or complexity. We are unable
to find any such distinctions being made by this court,
and in the Bunnell case the value of the property was
approximately the same as in the present case.
Appellants contend that the earnest money receipt
, leaves many important matters undecided, and specify
a great number of matters which might have been included but were not. Conceding the desirability of many
such provisions, such a specimen-type contract is not
required in order to be binding. If it were, the standard
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase could seldom be a contract, since it contains only the essential
provisions. While definitiveness in contracts for the
purchase of real property is desirable, it is not necessary.
This is set forth in a California case, King v. Stanley,
197 P.2d 321 (Cal., 1948), wherein it was stated:
1
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"Equity does not require that all the terms
and conditions of the proposed agreement be set
forth in the contract. The usual and reasonable
conditions of such contracts are, in the contemplation of the parties, a part of their agreement.
In the absence of express conditions, custom
determines incidental matters relating to the
opening of an escrow, furnishing deeds, title insurance policies, prorating of taxes, and the like.
(Citing cases.) The material factors to be ascer·
tained from the written contract are the seller,
the buyer, the price to be paid, the time and
manner of payment, and the property to be
transferred, describing it so it may be identified."

In the Stanley case the seller, who later refused to
go through with the transaction, also made the conten·
tion that the writings (consisting of letters between 1
the parties) were merely part of the preliminary nego·
tiations. In rejecting that contention the court stated: 1

"There was no determinable intent to reduce
these informal writings to a formal written con· I
tract. The existence of such intent would not I
necessarily prevent a binding obligation fro.m
arising, notwithstanding the contemplated ~:1t· j
ten or formal contract was never executed (c1tmg !
cases), unless it also appeared that the parties II
agreed or intended not to be bound until a formal
written contract was executed.

* * * The mere state of mind of the parties
is not the object of inquiry. The terms of th~
contract are determinable by an external, not b;
an internal standard - of by what ha~ b~en
termed the objective rather than the subJective
test."
22

In support of their position that the contract is
too uncertain to entitle respondent to specific performance, appellants cite Bruggeman v. Sokol, 265 P.2d
575 (Cal., 1954) and Hubbel v. Ward, 246 P.2d 468
(\Vash., 1952), both of which are clearly distinguishable. In the Bruggeman case, the contract consisted
of scrow instructions amended at last five different
times. Each amendment affected the purchase price
or the amount of property involved without clearly indicating how the original consideration was affected.
This resulted not so much in leaving some essential
term undecided, but leaving in complete confusion the
amount to be paid, and the time, place and conditions
of payment. Moreover, the consummation of the transaction was specifically made contingent upon FHA
and VA approval for construction loans, which were
never obtained. The court recognized that not all customary or usual provisions are required to be included
in a real estate purchase contract to make it specifically
enforceable, but only the material provisions, set forth
in the Stanley case, which the court specifically cited
and approved.
In their treatment of Hubbel v. Ward, appellants
leave the impression that the court denied specific performance. In fact, the court ordered specific performance of the contract on condition that plaintiff pay to the
seller the balance of the purchase price within thirty
days from the date of judgment. In that case, the
earnest money receipt specifically provided that so much
Would be paid down and the parties would "sign a con-
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tract for the balance" payable at $200.00 or more per
month. The court said this constituted an agreement
to enter into a future contract, which would contain
new and additional terms. The court apparently felt
that since the parties had specifically agreed to enter
into a subsequent contract setting forth provisions to
govern while the purchase price was being paid, all
material provisions were not present. It did, however,
regard all other material items as present and stated:
"Respondents were given an option to pay the
balance of the consideration in cash at any time.
By agreeing to accept payment of the purchase
price of $29,000, in either manner, appellant
entered into a contract of sale which, in its op·
tional aspect, is susceptible of specific perform·
ance."
In any event, this court in past cases has not gone
as far as the Washington Court in requiring specifica·
tion of so many optional provisions. For example,
see Fisher v. Bailey, 14 Utah 2d 424, 385 P.2d 985,
particularly the concurring opinion of Justice Crockett,
wherein it is stated:
"[IJn a contract of this character where some·
thing is to be done in connection with planned
future activities, as was the convefan~e of ~hede
lots, and specification of a definite tune is om1~te.'
the law will imply that it is to be done. with:;
some such reasonable time as must sen~1blX
supposed was contemplated by the parties.
In that case, this court ordered spec1"fi c per fornJ"

ance of a contract to sell real property even though no
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time for the purchase thereof was specified and many
other matters were left open.

1

Appellant also cite the case of Reich v. Christopulos, 123 Utah 137, 256 P.2d 238 (1953), and what
they say about the case is wrong. They point out that
the court stated that the earnest money receipt was only
preliminary and looked forward to a uniform real estate
contract, and then state that the court held that:
"The purchaser was, therefore, free to back
out of the agreement to sell until the uniform
real estate contract had been entered into." (Appellants' brief, p. 27.)
This is not at all what the court said. In that case
the real estate agent was given a check by the prospective purchaser and was to hold it for a few days.
The real estate agent did not pass this latter information on to the sellers and the court stated:

II
i

"Hill's own conduct in accepting the check
with the promise to hold it and his failure to disclose this fact to the Reich es made it possible for
Christopulos to back out of the deal and stop
payment on the check." (Emphasis added)

I Rather than supporting appellants' position, the hold-

! ing makes it clear that had the down payment not been
i given conditionally, the purchaser would have been
j bound.
\

1

Appellants treat the present case as though the
manner of payment of the balance due was not spelled
out, while as a matter of fact, the earnest money receipt
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specifically states that the balance will be paid in fif.
teen equal annual payments. The balance itself was
not indicated because the exact amount of the encumbrances being assumed by respondent was not known.
However, that is a matter readily capable of determination, which in turn leaves the amount of the annual
payments equally capable of determination. In the
cases cited by appellants on this point, such was not
the case. In Benson v. H. N. Ranch, Inc., 320 P.2d
440 (Wyo., 1958}, for example, the agreement pro·
vided that "balance payable by future agreement on
or before January 1, 1954." The court held that this
was susceptible to the two different meanings held by
the parties ; one, that the balance would be paid before
January 1, 1954; two, that the future agreement would
be reached on or before January 1, 1954. Certainly
such ambiguity is not present in this case.
The language of the agreement in Roberts v. Adams,
330 P.2d 900 (Cal. D.C., 1958} that the balance was
"payable as mutually agreeable by both parties" is
not apposite here where nothing was left open to mutual
agreement in connection with the payments to be made.
Appellants next argue that the earnest mo~ey
receipt is fatally deficient because it makes no mentwn
of the Keel property. Mr. Bennion, himself, answered
this argument in his deposition when he stated (Ben·
nion 29) : "We were just to hold it out, and that wasn't
to enter into the contract at all." Then of course,.
respondent had never disputed the fact that acreage
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from the Keel property was not to have been included
in the purchase.

1

1

In one of their frequent attempts to make respondent out a scoundrel, appellants make a most surprising
statement. They state that when respondent said he
would stand on his contract, he was using "a time worn
phrase used by those who attempt to hide behind legal
technicalities." (Appellant's Brief, p. 32). Respondent
does not believe that this court, or any other, considers
a contract to be a legal technicality.
Next, appellants list a number of matters which
they claim were left open and should have been included
in the contract. l\'Iany of the items mentioned are not
often included in the most formal contracts. If failure
to include them prevents specific performance, few
contracts could ever be specifically enforceable. Respondents ask, for example, whether the life estate (on
the five acres) was for the life of Mr. and Mrs. Bennion
or the corporation; on what day of the year each payment falls due (when they admit that first payment
is due one year from date of closing and the balance
is to be paid in equal yearly installments) ; when, where
and to whom interest is to be paid; where the closing
is to take place; and whether the buyer may assign his
interest. As pointed out in the cases previously cited,
such details are not essential to the validity of an instrument. Reasonable assumptions regarding them can
readily be made or they are controlled by legal presumptions and custom. In this connection, see Section
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32, Restatement of Contracts. An examination of the
illustrations will indicate that an omission of a number
of minor matters will not prevent formation of a valid
contract.
A contention that an earnest money receipt was
too indefinite for specific performance was made in
Neilsen v. Rucker) 8 Utah 2d 302, 333 P.2d 1067
( 1959), and rejected by this court. In that case it was
argued that the description in the contract, "the dairy
farm owned by Glen Neilsen and wife," did not suffi·
ciently identify the land to be traded. In exhibits an·
nexed to the contract, the real estate agent had inad·
vertently omitted one parcel of land so that the exhibit
showed only 52 acres, whereas the trial court decreed
that the sellers convey 110 acres. This court pointed
out that no one at the trial claimed that the three tracts
included all the land which constituted the dairy farm.
The court referred to the listing card showing the Neil·
sen farm to be located three miles north of Brigham
City, and owned and occupied by Glen Neilsen. In this
connection the court stated:
"The evidence without dispute clearly id~nti·
fies the land described in the decree as the N e1ls~n
farm. It is the only dairy farm which they claim
north of Brigham City or elsewhere."

*

*

*

"It is elementary that in equity that is certa!n
which can be made certain. In case * * * certain
·
con·
lands are mentioned by name mere1y ma
h
tract, without giving a definite description, t e
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* * * lands

intended in the contract may always
be shown by extrinsic, parol, or documentary
evidence."
Other contentions of vagueness or indefiniteness
were similarly rejected.
Another pertinent case is McKinley v. Legae, 24
Cal. Rep. 454 (Cal. App. 1962). In that case the
plaintiffs were the owners of a ranch known as the
"Chimney Rock Ranch." The defendant was a native
of Belgium, but an educated and experienced person.
He visited the Chimney Rock Ranch on several occasions with real estate agents, and had been shown around
the properties. After several such trips he made an
offer to buy the ranch, and signed an agreement entitled
"Deposit Receipt-California Real Estate Association
Standard Form." The next day the parties signed
escrow instructions and a down payment was given.
Before an inventory of personal property, as required
1n the contract, and a legal description could be made,
the defendant had served upon plaintiffs a notice of
rescission and demand for return of his down payment,
I on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation and his inability
to understand English. Defendant contended that there
\ was no valid contract of sale because the deposit receipt
; and escrow instructions were uncertain as to the real
' property and personal property to be conveyed. The
court, in holding that there was a valid contract, said:

I
I

"The basic question is whether it is sufficiently
definite to identify the real and personal property to be sold. The material factors to be ascer-
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"'

I

tained from the contract are the seller, the buyer
the price to be paid, the time and manner of pay~
ment and the property to be transferred describing it so it may be identified (citing cases). 'However, l T]he law does not favor but leans against
the destruction of contracts because of uncertainty and it will, if feasible, so construe agreements as to carry into effect the reasonable intentions of parties if that can be ascertained'."
The court said it was obvious from reading the documents that it was the intention of the parties not that
the personal property be identified or described in
detail but that it be ascertained and determined by the
time of sale:

"Appellants complaint seems to be that the
inventory was never taken, and that the testimony shows that McKinley was unable at the
trial to describe all of the personal property and
appurtenance to be conveyed. However, a com·
plete answer to this lies in the absence of any
showing that the personal property could not
have been ascertained or identified at the time
of sale, and in the proof that a complete inven·
tory thereof was frustrated by defendant's own
conduct.''
It was further held that defendant, by repudiating
E
the contract before the closing of the escrow, had re·
SJ
leased plaintiffs of any obligation to continue to prepare
I ti
the complete inventory, that a description is sufficient
I b1
and fulfills the test of reasonable certainty if it furnishe~
the "means or key" by which the description can be
made certain. J\ilany of the contentions made by appel·
! en
lants are answered in that case.

I:,
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Appellants next say the earnest money receipt is
unenforceable because respondent has failed to make
any payment on the contract. 'The answer to this is twofold: first, appellants repudiated the agreement before
respondent had an opportunity to make the initial
payment; second, there was an independent consideration in that respondent agreed to purchase and appellants agreed to sell the properties involved. Appellants
state that a mere recital of a receipt of consideration
does not prevent proof that the consideration was never
paid. This is true, but only for the purpose of showing
that the person promised the consideration is entitled to
receive it. This is set forth in Section 243, Restatement
of Contracts. 'The illustration appearing in that section
is very close :
"2. In an integrated agreement A promises
to sell Blackacre for $10,000 and B promises to
pay that sum for it. It is further provided that
the agreement shall have no effect until B pays
$1,000. 'There is a false recital that $1,000 has
been paid by B. A contract exists, but A's duty
to transfer is conditional on the full payment
by B of $10,000."

Respondent, of course, concedes that in order to obtain
: specific performance he will have to pay the consideration provided. His duty to pay has not yet arisen
because appellants have never offered to or been in
a position to perform. 'They have not tendered all the
abstracts required of them, and in fact ejected respondent from the property. In this connection see Rm sell
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v. Farrell, 181 Kan. 259, 311 P.2d 347, wherein the
court stated:
"As previously indicated the Farrells had not
place~ themseh:·es in a positi.on. to perform; they
were m possession of the bmldmg and their title
was encumbered. Under such circumstances there
was no obligation on the part of R,ussells to pay
the balance ?f the purchase price on January I,
1956, to entitle them to a decree of specific performa:tice."
Plaintiffs' claim of estoppel was raised for the first
time in their brief. Estoppel was not pleaded by appellants as an affirmative defense as required by Rule
8 ( c) nor was it ever raised by them at any time. In
any event, the matters claiming to constitute estoppel
were nothing more than those that arose during an
attempt to settle this matter. The settlement agreement
was also repudiated by defendants, and should not be
considered by the court.
In appellants' next attack they claim that they
should have the right to reform or rescind the contract
on the grounds of mutual mistake. This again is a
matter that was never pleaded or raised until appel·
lants' brief was submitted to this court. Mistake must
· Ian'tv. ·
not only be pleaded, but pleaded with part1cu
Appellants never asked for reformation of the contract.
But even more important, the facts do not show mutual
mistake of fact. Appellants rely on the case of Sine!'.
Harper 118 U. 415, 222 P.2d 571, to support their
,
h
tl evidence
position. That, however, was a case w ere le

32

indicated that both the seller and buyer were thinking
of a larger piece of property than that contained in the
contract of sale. The court noted that it was highly
improbable, under the circumstances, that the seller
could be thinking of only one tract and the purchaser
two, when, among other things, it was pointed out to
the seller that the reason the purchaser wanted the
property was to square out his adjoining property.
That is not the circumstances of the present case. If
there was a mistake it was a unilateral mistake on the
part of appellants which would not justify reformation
or rescission of the contract. There is no evidence that
appellants and respondents both had the same thing
mmind, but that through mistake, the agreement did
not represent the understanding.
The other case cited by appellants, Wright v. Lowe,
296 P.2d 34, (Cal. 1956), appears on the surface to
oe similar to the present case, but there is one extremely
important difference. The seller in that case had no
Knowledge of the large street and sewer assessments
which the purchaser agreed to assume, and the deduction of which resulted in the seller receiving nothing
at all for her property. The evidence indicated that
~he expected to receive some property which she was
going to use as a down payment on a small apartment
nouse. Had she been aware of the large deductions
ihe would not have had this expectation. The court
~oints out the fact that this was a controlling consideraahon when it stated:
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"Mrs. Wright was mistaken in having nounder~tandin~ of the deduction, contemplated by
Wright (sic) , of the amount of the assessment~
The mistake was mutual and related to the same
subject matter."
The appellants further contend that the contract should
be construed strictly against respondent because he is
an attorney and according to appellants prepared the
contract. The cases cited by appellants are not pertinent
to this transaction. The fact is that the contract was
not one prepared by respondent or Brown and sub·
mitted to appellants. Rather it was prepared in their
presence as they sat around the table and discussed the
matter. The terms were added during this procedure.
Moreover, there is no evidence that respondent tried
to use his legal knowledge to the detriment of appel·
lants. In fact, he had appellants call their attorney and
go over the earnest money receipt with him before it
was signed.

II
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT \VITH RESPECT
TO THE PURCHASE PRICE PROVISIONS
OF THE CONTRACT.
.
.
.
N otw1thstandmg
t l1e amount of time
spe nt in the
. f concernmg
.
.
appellants' br1e
issues
as t o definiteness,
.
and despite compounded innuendo about overreachuig.
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it is apparent from the record that the dispute which
gave rise to repudiation of the contract by the Benions, and to the bringing of this action by Mr. Amoss,
was over the purchase price for the properties.
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
provides for a "total purchase price of $197,000." Mr.
Bennion claims that in addition to the $197,000, Mr.
Amoss was to pay $35,000 to the Utah Farm Production Credit Association and $5,100 to R. Schofield. The
question presented by this appeal is whether a contracting party simply by raising a clamor, can create
ambiguity where none exists, and can avoid a contract's
plain terms by lengthy histories and constant repetition
of "I thought," "I assumed," and "I knew," when
those thoughts and assumptions, and that knowledge,
are in direct contravention of actions taken.
The Earnest Money Receipt which is the subject
of this litigation is not difficult to understand. The
defendants promised to sell to plaintiff the Bennion
Ranches in Daggett County, Utah, and Sweetwater
County, Wyoming, lock, livestock, and barrell, except
for a life estate in the home and five acres and certain
property listed in Schedule B and a portion of the
Keel place which was not to be considered as part of
the Bennion ranches. In connection with this conveyance the sellers agreed (Earnest Money Receipt, line
3iJ to "furnish good and marketable title * * * and to
niake final conveyance by warranty deed."
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Provisions relating to the purchase price and its
method of payment begin at line 12 of the contract
and are set out below (the hand written portions being
underscored and the blanks being as indicated):
"The total purchase price of ( $197,000) One Hundred
Ninety Seven Thousand Dollars shall be payable as follows
$500 which represents the aforedescribed deposit, receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged by you: $____________
_ __ when
seller approves sale; $14,500.00 Fourteen Thous Five Hund.
on delivery of deed or final contract of sale which shall be
on or before Sep. 1, 1964 and $ _______________________ .each year

commencing 1-year from date of closing. Payable inls
equal annual payments. Buyer to assume Federal Land Bank
Loan; PCA livestock loan; and R. Schofield range contract
until balance of $--------- __________________ together with interest
is paid, provided however, that buyer at his option, at any
time, may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments
upon the unpaid balance, subject to the limitation of any
mortgage or contract by buyer herein assumed. Interest at
5% per annum on the unpaid portions of the purchase price
to be included in the prescribed payments and shall begin
as of date of possession which shall be on or before ~
1, 1964. All risk of loss and destruction of property, and
expenses of insurance shall be borne by seller until date of
possession at which time property taxes, rent, insurance, interest, and other expenses of the property shall be pro-rated
as of date of possession. All other taxes and assessments,
mortgages, chattel liens and other liens, encumbrances and
charges against the property of any nature shall be paid b'.
the seller except: -----------------------·----------------- ______ ---

The following in the excerpted portion is important:
(I) that the "total" purchase price is to be $197,00~:
( 2) the provision respecting assumption of debts modi
fies the language "payable as follows"; and (3) the
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);

1

ie

sentence of the quoted paragraph provides that "all
other taxes and all assessments, mortgages, chattel
liens, and other liens, encumbrances or charges against
the property of any nature shall be paid by the seller
"
excep t : ---······················
Ja~t

I

If the parties had intended the PCA livestock
loan, the Federal Land Bank loan, and the R. Schofield
range contract to be borne by the purchaser without
, it having any effect on the purchase price, Line 24 of
the contract would haYe been the logical place to spell
' this out.

Moreover, the provision with respect to assumption
, of the PCA livestock loan and the R. Schofield range
contract are part of the same sentence and clause as
that in which the buyer assumes the Federal Land Bank
Loan; yet the sellers admit that they intended that the
amounts paid on the Federal Land Bank loans-the
largest of the three debts-would be applied against
the purchase price. It is difficult to see how a legitimate
argument can be made that the Federal Land Bank
loan, the PCA livestock loan, and the R. Schofield
range contract can be given anything other than identirnl treatment. Anyone who can read would be aware
,that all three of these debts were being treated exactly
! alike. The Bennions read the provision; it was read
to their lawyer.
1

This court can take judicial notice that the Ben: nions' attorney, J. Lambert Gibson, has been a member
. f the Bar for many years, and is experienced in both
11
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the District and Supreme Courts. It can also take
notice that the standard Earnest Money Receipt and
Off er to Purchase has been used for real estate purchases in Utah for many years and that attorneys
generally are familiar with the contents and the method
by which the obligations of the parties are spelled out.
Could Mr. Gibson be heard to say he didn't know what
the provision meant-or that the debts were to be
treated differently?
If Mr. Bennion is permitted to get away with
his attempt to add another $40,000 to the purchase
price in this contract, parties may as well give up the
idea of attempting to formalize their agreements. But
the objective theory of contracts has long been applied
in this state, and a contract should be construed as it
would be by a reasonable man in the position of the
contracting parties.
The repudiation of the contract and the claim by
the Bennions that they were entitled to additional com·
pensation is a blatant effort to obtain a higher pric.e
than they had agreed to. It is not a case of an exper1·
enced attorney dealing with an old man and an old
lady, but of knowledgeable sellers, represented by
counsel, agreeing to specific provisions, then deciding
it might be possible to obtain a higher price. In fact,
they succeeded in obtaining from plaintiff an agree·
ment that he would, in effect, increase the purchase
price by $17,500. Had the parties gone further ".ith
this agreement, presumably it would have been bindmg
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on Mr. Amoss. However, before the agreement was carried out, contract obligations were again repudiated
oy the Bennions and an attempt was made to re-take
the properties by self-help.
The provision with respect to the total purchase
price of the property was complete and unambiguous.
To permit the defendants in this case to introduce evidence of surrounding circumstances, history, and negotiations subsequent to the execution of the agreement
would be to violate the parol evidence rule as applied
oy this and other courts.
It is submitted that the only reasonable interprelation of the contract is that $197,000 was to be paid
:for a warranty deed to all of the Bennion Ranches

(except for the property specifically excluded) and
that for this price the purchaser was to obtain the
property free and clear of liens, taxes, and encumhances. If nothing had been said about the loans, the
Bennions would have been required to pay them in
order to furnish clear title. But here the buyer agreed
to assume them as a part of the purchase price.
The evidence given by the defendants at the hearing on the preliminary injunction was not properly
Defore the court in the motion for a summary judginent; in any event, because of the parol evidence rule,
it would not have been material on the question of
' 0nstruction of the provisions relating to the purchase
i11 ice. The affidavits of the parties, and the deposition
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of Heber Bennion, Jr., make it clear that the plaintiff
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the
amounts paid to remove encumbrances placed against
the properties by the Bennions should be a pp lied on
the purchase price of $197,000. The price was fixed
by Heber Bennion himself, not by Mr. Amoss, and
the sellers should be bound by the contract they
executed.

III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED
THAT BENNION RANCHING COMPANY
WAS BOUND BY THE CONTRACT.
Bennion Ranching Company is a close family cor·
poration owned almost entirely by Heber Bennion,
Jr., and Vera W. Bennion, in effect, their alter ego.
Appellants concede that Mr. and Mrs. Bennion, when
they signed the Earnest Money Receipt, held 78%
of the stock. Up until a year or so before the sale, Mr.
Bennion owned 95% of the stock. Apart from a qualifying one share held by J. Lambert Gibson, the remain·
ing stock was held by the Bennions' children, having
been given to them between 1963 and 1964 as an estate
planning device ( 2d Bennion Dep. 34) .
There is also little doubt that over the years, Mr.
Bennion managed the corporation's properties a)
though they were his own. That this is the case was
clearly demonstrated by the fact that appellants thern·
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;e]m never raised any defense that the corporation
had served a
1ras not bound until after respondent
request for admissions upon them in March, 1965, as
rart of the technical proof in this case. The defense
1'.as not raised in connection with the motion for preliminary injunction in November, 1964, nor was any
rrhjection made to subsequent findings of fact that all
uf the defendants had entered into the Earnest Money
Receipt. Although all of this took place some time
1fter l\Ir. Bennion consulted with all of the stocknolders of the corporation and advised them of the
transaction, it did not occur to anyone to maintain that
llr. Bennion was not authorized to act for the corporation until the request for admissions. It is suggested
•!nat this was because everyone involved considered the
wrporation and the Bennions for all practical purposes
1
0 be one and the same. This was a corporation that
nad few stockholders' meetings, and never had an
dection of officers after the corporation was set up,
rxcept to fill vacancies in the board of directors when
~lie Swans withdrew from the enterprise ( 2d Bennion
Dep. 38). It is also notable that when Mr. Bennion
'li1cussed the Earnest Money Receipt with his attorney,
0
nd another director, Mr. J. Lambert Gibson, over the
tlephone, no question was raised about Mr. Bennion's
'11thority to bind the company.
Appellants in their brief continually speak of re'rrrndent reneging on his agreement. Here, however,
't have the situation of a company run by one man
lirr proposed the agreement entered into, then when
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he wanted to get out of it says he wasn't authorized
and puts pressure on his stockholders and directors to
back him up-unless the buyer agrees to pay more.
It may be asked just who is trying to renege.

Appellants' attempt to rely on Section 16-10-74,
Utah Code Annotated. There are several answers to
their contention that the statute invalidates the sale.
As set forth in the annotation appearing in 58 A.L.R.
2d 784, the general rule is that statutes requiring the
consent of a percentage of the stockholders to validate
a disposition of corporate properties are intended for
the benefit of stockholders. The corporation itself has
no standing to allege the invalidity of a disposition
executed without the consent of stockholders required
by the statute. Appellants say there is a split of author·
ity on this question. However, an examination of the
annotation will reveal that the great majority of the
cases follow the general rule. In Section 1, referred
to by appellants, cases from only three states are shown
following the minority view. Most of those cases
are from the State of New York and as pointed out '
in a subsequent section (Section 15), the more recent
cases in New York are now in line with the weight of
authority.

One case cited in the annotation is Firestone Coal '
Co. v. Mcl(issick, 134 Pac. 147 (Colo., 1913). In that
case the corporation had given to the plaintiff three
promissory notes secured by mortgages on pro Pert\'· .~
owned by the corporation. In an action brought to '~
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foreclose the mortgages, the corporation pleaded want
of authority in the officers to execute the note and
mortgages in question. The defense was predicated
upon a statute which provided that the board of direc, tors of a mining and manufacturing corporation should
not have the power to encumber the mines of plaintiff
wrporation without having submitted the question to
)tockholders at a meeting regularly called and a majority of the stockholders having voted in favor of the sale
'or mortgage. The court held that the defense interposed
,wuld not be asserted by the corporation, but that the
1tockholders and they alone had the right to assert the
defense. In doing so, it quoted from the case of
Westerlund v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 F.2d 599,
is follows:
"But a corporation which has executed and
accepted the benefits of a contract within the
scope of its powers, that is neither in itself illegal
nor against public policy, and that is defective
only because in its execution the corporation has
failed to comply with some legal requirement
enacted for the sole benefit of third persons, is
estopped to assail it, and the beneficiaries of the
requirement alone may avoid it. Hence the stockholders of this corporation, and they alone, have
the right to avoid this lease because they alone
had any interest in the compliance with the legal
requirement that they should assent to its execution."
There are several other exceptions to the general
:iUle that officers of the corporation may not sell the
'torporate assets without stockholder approval. Almost
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all of these exceptions are applicable to this case. One
such exception was set forth in O'N eal, Close Corporations, Section 805, where the author says:
"The courts have rather consistently held officers
in a closed corporation to possess the power to
bind the corporation under circumstances which
would make a similar holding questionable in a
publically held corporation * * *. In view of the
typical patterns of operation in close corporations, holdings of this kind can usually be reconciled with traditional doctrine by viewing the
officer whose powers are in question as in fact
a general manager of the company thus having
a general manager's broad powers or by apply·
ing principles of ratification or of authority or
apparent authority by acquiescence. In any
event, only in rare instances, have courts failed
to hold a closed corporation bound by inter vivos
contracts entered into by any officer of the
corporation."
Cases and authorities holding that a president may
sell the entire property of a corporation, if the cor·
poration by a course of dealing and practice has allowed
him to assume entire control and management of its
affairs, are J eppi v. Brockman Holding Co., 34 Ca!.2d
11, 206 P.2d 847; Magowan v. Groneweg, 16 S.D. 29,
91 N.W.2d 335; Horn v. Bennett, 278 N.Y.S. 172;
In re Fensterer's Estate, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 427; Fletcher
Cyclopedia of Corporations, §606, wherein it is stated:
"Thus, the president and owner of a two- ti11'rd~
interest in a corporation has a right to make a
disposition of the corporate property."
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Jn the Groneweg case the court stated:

"The law neither does nor requires idle acts.
It would be an idle act to require the stockholders
and the directors to formally meet and authorize
themselves to sell the property, when the manager had had full control of the corporation, the
bill of sale was signed through the officers and
directors in the presence of the third director
and his wife, who made no objection thereto."
Other cases hold that where the directors have
turned over the full and absolute management of all
;mrporate affairs to the president, and in no way interiered with his acts, he is empowered to do any acts the
jfaectors could authorize or ratify. Allen v. France
!Packing Co., 90 A.2d 289; Ne'lvton v. Social Circle
Cotton Mill Co., 162 S.E. 667; Southern Hide Co. v.
\,Best, 141 So. 449; Fletcher supra § 594. In the Southiim Hide Company case, the president of the corpora.'.ion had donated certain corporate property to the
'wife of a deceased manager. The court held that he
!could exercise all the powers of a general manager
inere the board of directors had left him in charge
f the company. It was argued that donating public
iublic property was not within the power of the board
''directors and therefore the general manager theory
1
;' i~ not validate the transaction. The answer to the
1
JOtention was that the shareholders had acquiesced
nwhat the president had done.
1

•

!

This brings up the third answer to appellants'
rgument, as set forth in Fletcher §605:
45

"An unauthorized sale and transfer of property by the president may be ratified by the
directors if they could have made the sale, or by
the stockholders, and ratification may be implied
from acquiescence. And delay, negligence and
laches will estop the corporation to have the
unauthorized deed of its president set aside, as
where the directors after discovery of its execution and delivery fail to take steps promptly to
have the same set aside. * * * Mere silence or
delay in disapproving an unauthorized act of its
president in giving an option on the corporate
property may furnish a presumption of approval
in some cases."
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In another section, Fletcher points out that the
unauthorized acts of corporate officers may be ratified
either by the directors or the stockholders and that no 1n1
formal document or resolution is necessary for such :n1
ratification. Ratification may be express or implied. It ·~
may be deduced from a course of conduct on the part of "1
the directors, stockholders, or other officers of the cor·
poration. It may be implied from the conduct of the tJ
corporation or of officers having the authority to ratify i(
by acceptance of benefits with knowledge of the facts
or otherwise treating or recognizing the contract or
act as binding. Under some circumstances it may be
implied from mere failure to repudiate or disaffirm
the same (Fletcher §764).
!

Further, it is well settled the corporation cannot
ratify in part or repudiate in part, as the stockholders
attempted to do in the present case, and that 1't mt1st
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either repudiate or ratify the whole transaction. See
Fletcher §783 wherein its is stated:

"If any part of the contract is adopted and
ratified, it operates as a ratification of the whole."

In the present case it has been shown both in con-

t·

nection with appellants' offer of proof submitted at
1r Ifie first motion for summary judgment and in deposi:s tions, that the stockholders of the corporation had all
:e
ii icquiesced in the action taken by Mr. and Mrs. Bennion
'U11til they thought that the interpretation allegedly
1ut on the contract by Mr. Bennion was not correct.
ie
~d
As shown by the offer of proof, the directors rati10 1iled Bennions' interpretation of the contract but would
:h :not ratify Mr. Amoss' interpretation. A prior Utah
It 'rase involving an action against a corporation for speof c:ific performance of contract to sell real estate, wherein
r· Ifie defense was also raised that the officers who had
he txecuted the contract had not been authorized, is Peterfy ;~n v. Holmgren Land & Livestock Co., 12 Utah 2d
~ts l.!5, 363 P.2d 786. This court, in reply to that contenor non, stated :
0

!

I

1

be

'Ill

;rs
1st

"As to the first contention that there was no
evidence of authorization by the board of directors of the corporation for the execution of the
contract, it must be kept in mind that one of
the purposes for which the corporation was
formed by the family of which it was composed,
was the acquiring an alienation of real property
in connection with ranching and farming."
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There is a similar prov1s1on in the articles of incorporation of Bennion Ranching Company, as well
as a provision that the corporation might sell all of
its assets when 7 5% of the shareholders consent. The
court went on to state in its opinion:

"The father of the family was the president
of the corporation. It was at his home and at his tatio
behest that meetings of the board of the corpora· !~e
tion were held. * * *

:.1ere
1

1idec

"The minutes of the meeting were not kept In t:gaii
as professional a manner as might be expected ·
.
f rom a corporation
whose sole stockholders were r~
not members of one family and were for the most Jtne 1
part written in a brief and indefinite ~anner." ii1~p1
!r I
The court appeared to be describing the activities
ng I
1
of Bennion Ranching Company.
l.11 b
1

It is appellants' contention that Don Bennion, one
of the stockholders, should have been permitted to in·
tervene in the action. Our rules relating to intervention ::udg
1
provide that applications therefor must be timely. The nd
motion for intervention in this case was not made until
after the matter had been set for trial and recessed and
then determined much of the way by summary judg· ,
ment. There was no compliance with Rule 24 (c), which
provides that a person desiring to intervene shall sene
a motion to intervene upon all parties affected thereby
which shall state the grounds therefor and shall be
accompanied by a pleading setting forth a claim or
defense for which the intervention is sought. More·
1

1

1

48

,,m, Don Bennion has never appealed from the denial
,11'

his motion to intervene.

CONCLUSION

Because of the proxility of the appellants' presenlation of fact and argument, it is easy to lose sight of
!lie issues in the case and the methods by which they
,me presented to the trial court. The action was de:1ided on two motions for summary judgment, the first
l:gainst Vera W. Bennion and Heber Bennion, Jr.,
;who had admitted they executed the contract) ; and
jtne second against Bennion Ranching Company, with
' ji1~pect to which a question of authority had been raised
l1r Heber Bennion, Jr., president of Bennion Ranchng Company, who had himself signed the contract in
I
d1 behalf.

l

1

e

h

, Rule 56 establishes the procedure for summary
:.udgments and provides that the judgment is to be
11ndered forthwith when:
"The pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * * "

Rule 56 ( e) provides that affidavits shall be made
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
'· ou]d be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirm-

){'

II'
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atively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein. At the first motion for summarr
judgment there was before the trial court the followin~: i
the pleadings, a deposition of Heber Bennion, Jr.,
answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidarits 1
of Dudley M. Amoss and Dan Brown. In opposition
to the motion for summary judgment the defendants ·
tendered to the court an "offer of proof," which did not ~
in any way comply with the requirements of Rule
56 ( e) , or with the requirements for offers of proof.

:ti

The "offer of proof" which begins at R 1-61, is J
composed of 12 pages of argument and general state· ,,J
ment as to what the facts are. Patently, the offer does
not show personal know ledge on the part of any par· I'111
ticular person, does not show what witnesses would !m
testify to what facts, and is filled with conclusions, lti
assumption, and arguments of counsel. It ought not
to have been considered by the trial court in connection
i
with the motion.
1

1

Moreover, even if considered, it does not contain
anything which would raise a genuine issue as to any
material fact. We submit that statements relating 10
conversations and conferences, following the execution
of the agreement, and the negotiations prior to it. arr
not relevant in determining the purchase price of the
. is
. c1ear1y st at ed .in .the,
property. The purehase price
contract and the evidence of surrounding negotiatiorn
and transactions is not admissible to create an ambi·
guity.
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There might have been a factual issue about the
Keel place, and which 60 acres were to have been retained by the Bennions, and as to the description of the
!1ome and five acres, in which the Bennions were reservmg a life estate. However, as the case developed, fact
~sues were not raised with respect to these matters.
The affidavit of Dudley M. Amoss in support of the
motion for summary judgment contains statements
1
liat the home and five acres was pointed out to Mr.
Amoss by Mr. Bennion, and that the parties agreed
!nat the portion of the Keel place to be retained was
is set out in the judgment. The so-called offer of proof
,foes not contain any offer even as to what property
;~as to be included in the Keel place and there is no
ltridence to rebut the affidavit of Dudley M. Amoss
:nI. th'is respect or to show that other or different prop'
;trty was intended.
Although the appellants' brief was filled with
latements about negotiations that occurred subsequent
'rilhe execution of the Earnest Money Agreement, these
legotiations are not relevant to the interpretation or
nnstruction of the contract, since no ambiguity existed
~th respect to the purchase price. Moreover, the de'tndants have not claimed and, so far as we can tell,
~1Jnot now claim that the Earnest Money Receipt and
~ffer to Purchase was superseded by a subsequent
~ntract between the parties. There was an oral agreeJent between the Bennions and Mr. Amoss that, in
instance, the purchase price would be increased by
'li,500; and this agreement was entered into in an

1

am

1ny

· to
tion
arr
the
the
ions
11bi·
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effort to compromise and settle a dispute that had bee11 im
engendered by the Bennions' claim about the purchase jrn
price. This settlement agreement, if it had been per· itri
formed on the Bennions' part, might have bound the ith<
plaintiff to add $17,500 to the purchase price. But !!'I !€
before documents of title were tendered by the Ben· !Rt
nions, Mr. Bennion on or about October 24, 1964, re· 1~
pudiated any agreement and attempted to chase Mr. :1lic
Amoss and his helpers off the Bennion ranches. That lrh€
repudiation led to the lawsuit, and it relieved the plain· l!ee
tiff of any obligation to go through with the compromise it~€
and settlement agreement.
dn:

Iii

With respect to the Bennion Ranching Company, I
the evidence is clear that "lack of authority" was an
afterthought of either Mr. Bennion or his counsel iu
an effort to raise as many obstacles as possible to en·
forcement of the contract. The depositions of Mr.
Bennion and Mr. J. Lambert Gibson taken on May
28, 1965, show that the corporation was a close corpo·
ration and in substance the alter ego of Heber Beu·
nion, Jr. It had been used by him as a device for carrying out estate plans, and none of the other stockholders
participated in the management in any degree. Although
aware of the contract, not one of them tried to do anything about it until Heber Bennion himself indicated
he didn't want the corporation to be bound. Indeed, it
was Heber Bennion's counsel who moved for inter·
vention in behalf of Don Bennion (R2-177).
. dcr

The trial court properly entered summary JU
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I

'.,ment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defend\ints as requested in the two motions. In addition the
\!rial court added to each of the judgments a certificate
e ::hat there was no reason for delay and directed the
\,,\erk to enter the judgment forthwith as provided in
1Rule 54 ( b) , and the judgments were final for the pur\roses of appeal. The fact that the court retained juris1,Jiction to work out the details of the decree and to fix
l:nedamages and costs, including a reasonable attorney's
liee, did not preven this. The substance of the case had
e jlleen decided by the trial court and the judgment was
;inal for purposes of appeal. In re Voorhees Estate,
\11 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977.
1

I

I

I

I

The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYCE E. ROE
RALPH L. JERMAN
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